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A.: Vendor and Purchaser--Complete Purchase--Doctrine of

STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES

injuries resulting from its wrongful or negligent act. It
is suggested that New York is perhaps right in this, and
that the courts of our own and other states would do well
to follow her lead.
-J. H. W.
VENDOR

AND

PURCHASER-COMPLETE

PURCHASER-DOC-

TRINE OF.-In a recent case, the plaintiff, as owner of
the oil and gas under a seventy-five acre tract, seeks
by a bill in equity to perpetually enjoin the defendant, lessee of the board of education, from drilling a well,
and to cancel, as a cloud upon plaintiff's title, the lease
from the board of education to the defendant. The only
issue of fact is whether the plaintiff is a complete purchaser
of the oil and gas rights in the tract without notice of the
rights of the defendant under an unrecorded deed to the
board of education from a common grantor. Held, that
to be protected by Section 5, Chapter 74 of the Code,
against a prior unrecorded deed, one must be a complete
purchaser for value, must have had no notice of the prior
contract or deed, and must have paid all the purchase
money for the land purchased by him. United Fuel Gas
Co. v. Morley Oil and Gas Co., 131 S. E. 716 (W. Va.
1926).
In laying down the above rule the Supreme Court has
followed the common law doctrine of "complete purchaser",
whereby one, though he had paid part of the consideration,
if he received notice of a prior claim before completing
the payment (or even after paying the whole, if he received
notice before obtaining his conveyance), would lose all his
claim upon the land. Tourville v. Naish, 3 P. Wins. 307;
Wigg v. Wigg, 1 Atk. 384; Story v. Lord Windsor, 2 Atk.
630; Beverley v. Brooke, 2 Leigh 446. This common rule
has been uniformly followed in West Virginia by recent
decisions and perhaps by all the decisions in this state on
the point with the exception of one case. Mitchell and
Romine v. Dawson, 23 W. Va. 86. In that case however,
the court held that C although he received notice of B's
equitable lien before paying all the purchase price, took
the land from A discharged from B's lien except as to that
part of the purchase money still due from C to A at th6
time he received notice of B's lien. The Supreme Court
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in its decision in the United Fuel Gas Co. Case makes no
mention of the Mitchell Case just referred to. However,
as there have been numerous decisions since the Mitchell
Case, holding, in effect, that a complete purchaser is one
who has paid all the purchase price and received a conveyance of the legal title, the Mitchell Case has undoubtedly been overruled in West Virginia. Welch v. King, 82
W. Va. 258; Webb v. Bailey, 41 W. Va. 463; Heck v.
Morgan, 88 W. Va. 102. Virginia has a somewhat different doctrine as to who is a complete purchaser entitled to
the protection of a court of equity. In 1881, the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that a complete purchaser is one
who has paid the purchase money, and who, although he
has not received a conveyance of the legal title, is entitled
to call for it. Preston v. Nash,76 Va. 1. In 1887 the
legislature of Virginia, recognizing the severity of the
common law rule, enacted that:
"As against any person claiming under a deed or other
writing which shall not have been admitted to record
before payment by a subsequent purchaser for valuable
consideration of the whole or a part of his purchase
money, such subsequent purchaser notwithstanding such
deed or other writing be admitted to record before he
becomes a complete purchaser, shall, in equity, have a
lien on the property purchased by him for so much of his
purchase money as he may have paid before notice."
Virginia Code, 1924, § 5200.
Minor, in commenting on this Virginia statute, says it does
not seem to apply if the subsequent purchaser obtains
notice of the prior claim otherwise than by its tardy admission to record. Minor, Real Property, §1409. It will be
seen therefore, that even in Virginia under the present
statute the Mitchell Case would not be followed, for in it
the subsequent purchaser did not receive notice of the prior
lien by its admission to record and in such instance common
law principles would still seem to apply in Virginia and
the purchaser would have no lien at all. It will be noticed
that the Virginia statute by making the recordation of the
prior conveyance notice to the subsequent purchaser, who
has not yet paid the entire purchase price, puts a burden
upon the purchaser in having to search the record every
time he makes a payment, to ascertain whether a conveyance prior to his has been recorded since he made his last
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payment. Needless to say, the requirement of such action
from the purchaser is utterly impracticable. It is also
submitted that the relief afforded a subsequent purchaser
by the Virginia statute is not as desirable as that given in
the Mitchell Case, since, in Virginia, the subsequent purchaser upon learning of the prior unrecorded conveyance
merely receives a lien in equity on the property purchased,
for so much of his purchase money paid before he received
notice, but the Mitchell Case lets him keep his bargain and
only makes him responsible to the owner of the prior
unrecorded conveyance for the amount of the purchase
price still due. The Supreme Court of West Virginia
could then, no doubt, by a reaffirmance of the doctrine of
"complete purchaser" as laid down in the Mitchell Case, go
even farther in protecting a subsequent purchaser, who
has paid only part of the purchase price, then he receives
under the Virginia statute. In thus tempering the common
law doctrine the Court could reach a more desirable end
than that afforded in Virginia and, a fortiori, more desirable than the doctrine as laid down in the recent United
Fuel Gas Co. Case.
-H. R. A.
PRACTICE IN JUSTICE'S COURT JOINING OR SPLITTING CAUSES

OF ACTION.-The plaintiff brought two actions against the
defendant, before a justice of the peace, for $498.50,
in the aggregate, the purchase price of flour. In the
first action, the plaintiff recovered $276.00, for flour
sold and delivered from January 2 to January 18, 1924, on
bills payable February 1, 1924. To the plaintiff's second
action, on bills due December 1, 1923, and January 1, 1924,
for flour sold and delivered during November and December, 1923, and also on bills for sales and deliveries on
January 19 and 21, 1924, the defendant pleaded part of §48
c. 50, W. VA. CODE, quoted below, as a special plea in
bar. Judgment was given for the plaintiff, and was affirmed on appeal to the circuit court. The defendant brought
error. Held, judgment affirmed. Clay v. Meadows, 130
S. E. 656 (W. Va. 1925).
This case seems to have been decided upon the doctrine
of stare decisis; for it is admitted, in the opinion, that
"individual members of the court entertain the view that
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